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THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

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


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# The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

A Series of Articles reprinted from the *Peking and Tientsin Times*.

## I.

### THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY.

(March 26, 1920.)

The Treaty of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, signed in London on July 18, 1911, was to remain in force for ten years from that date, and was not to lapse at the conclusion of that term unless one of the high contracting parties had denounced it "twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years." If the full term of the Treaty were to run without such denunciation, it was to remain in force automatically until denounced with one year's full notice, on either side. If the Alliance is not to be renewed, therefore, one or other of the High Contracting Parties must denounce the Treaty on or before July 18, 1920, and it will then cease to operate from July 18, 1921. The question of the renewal of the Alliance is already a common topic in the columns of the Japanese Press. On the whole, Japanese opinion is favourable to renewal. It was not so, during the war, when a large section of the Japanese Press found the terms of the Alliance irksome, and openly expressed the opinion that Japan would be better off without it. Now, however, the possibility of Japan's being completely isolated is not welcomed. And though the Japanese Press is inclined to lay stress upon the advantages to be derived by Great Britain from the renewal, it is clear that in the uncertain world-situation that has followed the conclusion of the Great War, the Alliance is regarded as the sheet-anchor of Japanese diplomacy.

The arguments for and against renewal, and the problems arising from them, cannot be discussed in a single article. All that we propose to do to-day is to emphasize a few of the considerations which will influence British statesmen in coming to a decision. In 1911, when the Alliance was renewed for the second time, the world-situation was very different from that of the present day. The revision of the 1905 Treaty was influenced by the facts that the Russo-Japanese War had ended, shortly after the signature of the second Treaty, and that a Treaty of Arbitration with the United States necessitated safeguards against Great Britain's becoming engaged against her will, in a conflict with America. In the 1911 Treaty, Japan's paramount rights in Korea, and Britain's special interests on the Indian frontier, were not referred to. Otherwise the 1911 Treaty followed the lines of that concluded in 1905. In 1911 China was still a Monarchy. The chief menace to China was still from Russia, who, though she had formally recognized the integrity of China by a Treaty with Japan, in 1907, took advantage of the Revolution to insist upon China's recognition of the "autonomy" of Outer Mongolia.

The objects of the Alliance were stated to be:

"A.—The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.

B.—The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

C.—The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions."

The *casus foederis* of the Alliance was deemed to have arisen on the outbreak of the Great War, in August 1914, when Great Britain had her hands full in the West, and called upon her Ally to eliminate the German menace from Eastern Asia by effective operations against Tsingtau. This the Japanese Naval and Military forces, with the co-operation of small British units, did, by taking Tsingtau, after a brief siege and blockade. Although the Alliance did not limit Japan's naval and military co-operation to the Far East—the obligation assumed by each Power was that where one of the High Contracting Parties was involved in war "in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it"—Japan's further aid was limited to the despatch of some of her naval units to European and other waters to assist in hunting down German raiders, and at a later stage—German U-Boats. The Japanese Government, for reasons which may have been perfectly sound, did not favour the despatch of troops to Europe. Its Army, therefore, remained inactive until, in the final phase of the conflict, Japan participated in the joint military expedition to Siberia.

Now when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was first concluded, in 1902, the obligation that each Party incurred was to remain Neutral if its Ally became involved in a defensive war "with another Power," but to come to its assistance "if in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that Ally." As long, therefore, as Russia was engaged in war with Japan single-handed, Britain was under no obligation to do aught but remain Neutral. If France had entered the conflict Britain would automatically have become a belligerent. And the recent publication of the Willy-Nicky letters reveals the fact that Kaiser and Tsar were doing their utmost to form a European Coalition which would have brought England into conflict with practically the whole of Europe. In that case Britain's obligations to Japan would not have ceased with the despatch of a small expedition to the continent, to capture an outlying enemy fortress, and the employment of a small portion of her Fleet in hunting down enemy raiders and submarines. From 1905, when the Alliance embodied a definite undertaking on each side to come to the assistance of the Ally in the event of "unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers," the obligations assumed by Great Britain were of a most far-reaching character. In view of China's helplessness and inefficiency, it must have been evident that she would be incapable, during the term of the Alliance, of such "unprovoked or aggressive action" against Japan as would constitute a *casus foederis* under the terms of the Treaty. The latter could only have envisaged such action on the part of a European Power such as Russia, France, or Germany, in which event the brunt of the naval warfare, and probably very serious military responsibilities, would have been borne by Great Britain. We mention these facts merely to show that from 1902 to 1905, Britain incurred the risk of battling singlehanded against a European Coalition, and that from 1905 onwards, any attack upon Japan, "wherever arising" would have resulted in the assumption of most serious naval (and possibly military) obligations on the part of the British Empire. The logical inferences are: that to this extent the Alliance was an extremely one-sided affair; that the risks assumed by Great Britain were out of all proportion to those assumed by Japan; and that it is impossible to imagine circumstances in which Britain would have found herself compelled to come to Japan's assistance which would have restricted her naval and military activities within such narrow limits as Japan's during the years 1914 to 1918. In a subsequent article we shall deal with the political aspects of the Alliance in the Far East during the world-war.

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## II.

### THE FIRST PHASE OF THE GREAT WAR.

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(March 29, 1920.)

During the first term of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-5) Japan was virtually an unknown quantity in world-politics. Only when she had fought and defeated Russia did the world realize that she was destined to become a factor of the utmost importance in the Far Eastern situation. During the second term of the Alliance (1905-11) Japan was occupied chiefly with the consolidation of her gains in Korea and Manchuria. Korea became a Japanese Protectorate in 1906. From Manchuria there were constant complaints of violation of the "Open Door" Policy and of the principle of equal opportunity for all. In 1908 there was an exchange of Notes between America and Japan under which both Powers committed themselves to: the encouragement of free and peaceful development of their commerce in the Pacific; the maintenance of the *status quo* and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China; reciprocal respect for the "territorial possessions belonging to each other in the said region;" and the independence and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire. Outside of Manchuria Japan was content with a passive role until the outbreak of the Revolution. She was not represented in the Four Power Group that arranged the Currency Loan of 1911, nor was she a party to the Hukuang Railway Agreement, which was one of the causes of the Revolution. But after the overthrow of the Manchus her policy towards China became much more ambitious and aggressive. The murder of two Japanese barbers and a grocer, at Nanking, during the second Revolution was followed by the presentation of a series of drastic demands, and a show of force which compelled the Central Government to yield. If we remember rightly compensation amounting to £ls. 600,000 was claimed for this outrage and \$15,000 was paid to one of the barbers. When five Chinese railway police were shot by the Japanese at Changli, with little or no provocation, the Japanese Government attempted to settle the incident by tendering a "compassionate grant" of \$50 to each of their families! Japan, also, was among the Powers that claimed for "indirect losses" arising out of the Revolution, in addition to indemnification for actual damage. She entered the International Consortium after the Revolution, although not, herself, in a position to finance China on a large scale, and during the two Revolutions she made a number of small loans to various Provincial Authorities, in return for mineral concessions. On the whole, however, it may be said that with the exception of Manchuria where Japan allowed nothing to obstruct her designs, she was willing to subordinate her policy in China to that of the Great Powers, until the outbreak of the European War.

Japan's policy then underwent a radical change. As the Ally of Great Britain she was pledged to do all in her power to consolidate and maintain the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, to preserve the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, and to maintain the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. The naval and military resources of her Ally were strained to the utmost during the European war, and Japan, by providing the bulk of the forces necessary to reduce Tsingtau, and by employing a portion of her Fleet to hunt for German raiders and submarines, rendered valuable services in the common cause. But her interpretation of her responsibilities in the Far East was amazing. As soon as it was clear that the war was likely to be protracted, and that the whole civilized world was so preoccupied with events in the West that little or no interest was felt regarding the situation in the Far East, Japan initiated a policy of naked aggression towards China. The story of the negotiations in connection with the Twenty-one demands is familiar to most of our readers. It is a story that few Japanese can recall without a feeling of shame. Viscount Kato, who had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, was Foreign Minister, in Count Okuma's Cabinet, at the time. And it would be difficult in the most unsavoury chapters of modern diplomacy to find anything worse than the chicanery and deceit employed to ward off foreign protests until Japan had got her way. When the details of the demands had leaked out, in spite of Japanese threats and precautions, Count Okuma gave out an interview in which he declared: that the criticisms of Japan were due to German instigation; that Japan's propositions "are in complete accord with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with all treaties and engagements with other countries guaranteeing equal opportunity and the integrity of China:" that Japan was not seeking to establish any monopoly in China or improperly to infringe the rights and interests of other Powers; that Japan had not demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers; and that when the final disclosures were made, it would be found that "the entire situation has been grossly exaggerated." Every one of these statements was untrue. Japan knew full well that the acceptance of her outrageous demands could never be obtained by peaceful means. It is probable that she would have pressed for the acceptance of the whole of the Twenty-one Demands, but for the fact that her actions were beginning to excite hostile comment in Europe and America. Sir Edward Grey was being bombarded with questions in the House of Commons—questions to which he was unable to give frank or full replies. He could only state that Great Britain continued to be bound by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when what all the world wanted to know was whether Japan also, continued to be bound by them. It was not until May 16 that America took any action, though it may be supposed that she had made inquiries of Peking and Tokio before matters came to a crisis. On that date she presented identical Notes to China and Japan, declaring that the Government of the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or understanding, which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the Treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy." On May 7, 1915, a day which will go down to history in connection with two tragedies, one in the West (the sinking of the *Lusitania*) and the other in the Far East, Japan presented an Ultimatum to China, requiring immediate acceptance of all but Group V of the Twenty-one Demands. Group V, compliance with which would have converted China into a Japanese Protectorate, was at the last moment "detached" from "the present negotiation," to be discussed "separately in the future." China was helpless at the moment. She could expect no real aid from Europe or America in resisting Japan's pretensions, and had, perforce, to accept the Demands, many of which could only be reconciled with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the exchange of Notes between America and Japan, by a casuist of an exceptional (shall we say Japanese?) mentality. It is, however, on the strength of the pledges thus extorted from China that Japan bases her present claims in respect of Shantung—claims which, as the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce pointed out only on Friday last, admit of only one construction, "namely she is not going to allow any other nation to have the opportunity of trading on fair and equal terms with her nationals."

The Japanese will probably never understand the impression made upon Britons and their European Allies in China by the Twenty-one Demands. It seemed to us a complete betrayal by our Ally—a betrayal the more callous because it was committed during a period when the British Empire was literally fighting for its existence. During the brief period that intervened between the presentation and the acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum, Britons throughout the Far East were asking themselves, what next? Was Japan, our Ally, deliberately provoking a rupture with China as a pretext for changing sides during the Great War? Every Briton knew that this crisis had been brought on against the wishes of his Government. It seemed impossible that if we emerged victorious from the War, the concessions extorted from China in this outrageous manner would be recognized by our own and Allied Governments. If Japan really wanted to make sure of her booty, was not her obvious course to make common cause with our foes, who would gladly have granted her a free hand in the Far East, and much else beside, for her co-operation? Confidence in Japan's integrity and intentions was shaken as it had never been shaken before in the whole course of the Alliance, and as it must never be shaken again, if that Alliance is to be renewed, and to be of the slightest value to Great Britain. And when Japanese statesmen, when Japanese Missionaries, tell us that "there is not a shadow of aggressiveness in the policy of the present Japanese Government toward China" we are constrained to reply that even if that be true, the present policy of Japan in China is deep-rooted in the great injustice of 1915, and that the only way to regain the confidence of China, and of the rest of the world is to lay the axe to the root, which can never produce aught but poisonous and bitter fruit. In our next article we shall deal with the various phases of Japanese policy in China after the Ultimatum of 1915.

## THE SECOND PHASE OF THE GREAT WAR.

(April 7, 1920.)

In our last article on this subject we dealt with the presentation by Japan of the notorious Twenty-one Demands, in the early part of 1915, and the deplorable impression created upon her Allies and her friends by the Ultimatum of May 7, 1915. We now pass on to a necessarily brief, and incomplete review of Japan's subsequent interpretations of her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The next incident worthy of notice is the proposal, which had the support of the British, French, and Russian Governments, that China should openly align herself with the Entente Powers, in the latter half of 1915. There were various reasons why this step was considered desirable in the common interest, upon which it is unnecessary to dwell. Suffice it to say that the Triple Entente considered that a rupture between China and the Teutonic Powers would be beneficial to their interests, not only in Asia, but throughout the world, that Japan was kept fully informed of the negotiations which were in progress, and that it was Japan who interposed her veto, after prematurely revealing her Allies' plans, when the Chinese Government had agreed to join the Entente Powers upon mutually satisfactory terms. The Japanese Ambassador at Washington was responsible for the leakage of information regarding the negotiations, and the Japanese Government, which had not previously displayed hostility to the plan, suddenly announced its inability to permit China's participation in the World War. The actual words used by Baron Ishii were that "Japan could not view without apprehension, the moral awakening of 400,000,000 Chinese which would result from their entering the war." It may be perfectly true that China then and subsequently was in no position to render effective naval or military aid to the Allies but she was in a position to assist them very materially with her natural and industrial, and, what was even more important, her labour resources. So long as China remained neutral the recruiting of coolie labour, which proved so valuable behind the lines in France and elsewhere was conducted under serious difficulty. It was impossible to secure the numbers, or the types of workers required, and put at its lowest, the Japanese veto against China's intervention, deprived the Allied Powers of valuable aid which might have made a considerable difference in the later phases of the war. It was not until America had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, and invited China (without even consulting Japan) to do the same, that the rupture between China and the Central Powers took place, and it cannot, we think, seriously be contended that Japan rendered her Ally any real service by causing this delay. China was united and possessed a strong Central Government in 1915; in 1917 her effective participation was virtually paralysed by internal dissensions.

It is an open secret that the reason advanced for Japan's opposition to China's entry into the war in the latter part of 1915 was her fear of the consequences of awakening military activity on the part of a nation of 400 millions. But the sincerity of this reasoning appears doubtful when one recalls the huge contracts for arms which were made by Japan with the Northern Militarists, between 1916 and 1918, and the attempt, in the first half of 1915, to secure control of the Chinese Army, and a virtual monopoly of the supply of its arms and munitions. The least reproach that can be levelled at Japan on this score is that she showed herself extremely selfish, and quite indifferent to the wishes and interests of her Allies in Europe. The real reason for Japan's attitude at this time must, we fear, be found in her design to turn the preoccupation of her Allies to the fullest possible account in prosecuting her schemes to make herself, indisputably, the paramount Power in the Far East. Some time later, when America had ceased to be neutral, the obvious trend of Japan's policy in the Far East, prompted Mr. Lansing to suggest to Viscount Ishii, the reaffirmation of the policy of the Open Door, and the preservation of China's territorial integrity. Viscount Ishii at once raised the question of the recognition of Japan's "special interests," but, as Mr. Lansing has since testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he declined to extend this recognition on behalf of the United States Government, unless it were clearly understood that there was no question of acknowledging that Japan had "paramount interests" in China. All that America was prepared to read into the words "special interests" was "that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not of a political nature." Mr. Lansing was averse from the use of the phrase at all, fearing that it might be wrongly construed, and in this fear he was, as it proved, correct. The Lansing-Ishii Note really achieved nothing except to make the Chinese believe that they had been "sold" by the United States.

Mr. Lansing had good ground for fearing that it was "the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China—political influence." For, following the 1915 Ultimatum, Japanese agents concluded a host of secret financial and economic agreements with various unscrupulous Chinese officials, the obvious object of which was to acquire by these means the privileges upon which she did not dare to insist, in May 1915. Loans ranging from one to forty million yen were made to the Governments in Peking and the Provinces, and in some cases to Provinces in open rebellion against Peking. Twenty-nine such loans, totalling more than Yen 246,000,000 were made in the year 1918 alone, and the effect of this indiscriminate financing of notoriously corrupt officials was to foment and prolong the internal dissensions from which China is suffering even to this day. Whenever taxed with responsibility for these loans, the Japanese Government invariably took shelter behind the excuse that they were contracted without its knowledge or approval, but this pretence is belied by the lavish rewards bestowed upon those who were most successful in "financing" China.

The dramatic termination of the war, which aroused less enthusiasm in Japan than in any other Allied country, caused serious misgivings in Government circles in Tokio as to the results of Japan's policy in China during the preceding four years. It is scarcely necessary to recall the clumsy efforts that were made in Peking to intimidate the Chinese Government into suppressing the various secret engagements into which it had been compelled to enter during the war, and to make the Chinese Delegation to Paris subordinate to the Japanese Delegates. Japanese statesmen were unable to conceal their apprehension at the prospect of China's playing an independent part at Paris, and but for the immediate publicity given to Tokio's attempts at intimidation, and the deplorable impression that would have been created throughout the world had Japan proceeded to carry out her threats, China would probably have been compelled to submit all her proposals at Paris to Japan, for the latter's approval, and to limit her activities in the Peace Conference to echoing the opinions of the Japanese Delegation. On this occasion, however, China was not bludgeoned into silence. She entered a very effective protest against the injustices to which she had been compelled to submit by Japan during the Great War, and maintained her opposition to recognition of Japan's claims to the extent of refusing to sign the Peace Treaty. Unless Chinese statesmen are so corrupt or contemptibly cowardly, when confronted with Japan's demands in the future, they can no longer be compelled to maintain silence regarding the injustice of Tokio's treatment. Europe and America are still so absorbed in problems arising out of the war that even to-day they have little time or energy to devote to Far Eastern problems. The question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will, however, compel the British Foreign Office, at least, to give careful consideration to its policy in the Far East, and should afford British Statesmen an opportunity to make the renewal conditional upon a complete understanding as to Japan's aims and intentions in the future, even if it be impossible to secure reconsideration of the wrongs committed upon China in the past, when Japan assumed the role of paramount Power in China, and placed so curious an interpretation upon her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1911.

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IV.

WHEN THE "WRONG HORSE" WON.

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(April 16, 1920.)

In previous articles we have dealt with the origin of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, its operation prior to the Great War, and the manner in which its obligations were interpreted by Japan during that War. The history of the Alliance has not been dealt with exhaustively, but it has, we trust, been dealt with fairly. We may sum up our conclusions briefly, as follows. During the first period of the Alliance the weight of its obligations rested upon Great Britain, who incurred the risk of being pounced upon by a European Coalition in the event of Japan's becoming engaged in war. Subsequently, inasmuch as Japan had nothing to fear from China or from Russia, Great Britain would have had to bear the brunt of any conflict that arose between Japan and a European Power. The tendency of Japan's policy in the Far East became more and more aggressive from the time of the Chinese Revolution, culminating, in 1915, in the presentation of the notorious Twenty-one Demands to China. Since the Ultimatum of May 7, 1915, Japan has acted, so far as China has been concerned, as if the Alliance did not exist. She has ignored the wishes and interests of her Ally, extracted from her undertakings which could not be refused in the midst of a life-and-death struggle, and contrary to the plain intention of the Alliance prosecuted a policy in China which has had the effect of perpetuating internal strife, and weakening the country in such a way as seriously to jeopardize its integrity. Japan vetoed China's intervention in the war when the country was united, and its aid might have been of real service; she only agreed to Chinese intervention when the country was torn with dissensions, and she took advantage of that fact to get through the Military Pact which is now used as a pretext for extending her military activities to Northern Manchuria.

What advantages has Britain derived from the Alliance? Most of them, assuredly, have been of a negative character. Apart from the reduction of Tsingtau, and the co-operation of a small portion of the Japanese Fleet, Japan studiously refrained from actively assisting her Allies. She did us no small disservice in China, by adopting a policy which could never have had our support or approval. But she did not attack our Far Eastern possessions, or India, which, considering the trend of her policy in 1915, is something to be thankful for. It is however, hardly the sort of compliment one would like to pay to an Ally to say that one's chief cause for gratitude is to be found in the fact that that Ally abstained from open hostility during a war in which the *casus foederis* of the Alliance admittedly arose. Nevertheless Japan's conduct during the war can only be reconciled with the theory that within a few months the Tokio Government became convinced that it had "backed the wrong horse," and, while it did not deem it desirable actually to change sides—such an act of perfidy could hardly be perpetrated by any Government possessing the slightest self-respect—it felt no compunction about treating the terms of the Alliance as if they were mere "scraps of paper." It can scarcely be doubted to-day that Japan, after the first six months of war, acted upon the assumption that the conflict could only end in a draw or a German victory, in neither of which cases was she likely to be called to account for her actions in the Far East. It is noteworthy in this connection that from the time of the presentation of the Twenty-one Demands a section of the rigidly censored Japanese Press conducted a persistent and venomous campaign against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and welcomed and gave prominence to, articles from Japanese militarists and professors of pro-German views. The British and French censorship unfortunately kept Britain and France in ignorance of what was really happening in the Far East, and Japanese statesmen must have read, tongue in cheek, the tributes of Allied statesmen to Japan's loyalty and determination to abide by her pledges to Great Britain.

When what was suspected of being the "wrong horse" proved to possess unexpected staying powers, and, eventually, to be the winner, Japan, as already mentioned in a previous article, endeavoured to choke off all opposition to her pacts with China by taking the Chinese Delegation to Paris as a vassal mission. In this she failed, but by pressing unacceptable demands upon the Allied Leaders, and producing pledges extracted virtually under duress from Britain, France and Italy, she succeeded in securing recognition of the most far-reaching of her claims. Their injustice must have been obvious to the Allied Leaders, who, however, were too much preoccupied with European questions to give those of the Far East the attention they deserved, and were satisfied with Japan's verbal assurances that there was a wide margin between what Japan wanted embodied in the Peace Treaty, and what she actually intended to claim.

The Alliance must be denounced by one of the High Contracting Parties on or before July 13, 1920, if it is to terminate in July 1921. It may be taken for granted that no denunciation will come from Japan. The Alliance has worked admirably from her point of view, and its extension, indefinitely, upon the same terms would suit her very well. Its denunciation, on the other hand, would seriously affect her position in international politics. There is some suggestion that if the Alliance were not renewed Japan might be driven into the hands of Russia or Germany. So far as the Russians are concerned, unless there is a complete revulsion of feeling, any Alliance with Japan must be considered incredible. As well might one expect an Alliance between Germany and France. There has never in history been a time when the Russian people have been animated by such intense hatred of the Japanese as to-day. A Japanese Alliance with Germany would be futile as long as the Entente Powers insist upon the observance of the naval and military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. There is no other Power that is likely, with full knowledge of Japanese activities in the Far East, to seek an Alliance with her. Before the war her Army, having beaten the Russians in Manchuria, was considered one of the most formidable and efficient in the world. To-day, compared with the Armies and equipment of France, Britain, and America, it must be considered a second-rate force. Japan has not yet succeeded in manufacturing or developing the use of any of the instruments which proved so effective in achieving the overthrow of the Central Powers: aeroplanes, monster artillery, tanks, and other weapons which were in daily general use on the European battlefields. Her Navy is far more efficient, but dwarfed by the Navies of Britain and the United States. She has, indeed, very little to offer as a *quid pro quo* for an Alliance with an important European Power. If the war revealed anything it was her absolute dependence upon foreign supplies for the raw materials with which to make ships, weapons and munitions. We do not expect Japan to make any serious attempt to find an Ally in another quarter, but we shall be extremely surprised if she does not strive might and main to secure the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its abrogation by Britain's denunciation would be a disastrous blow to Japanese prestige throughout the world. For it would be generally interpreted as evidence of Britain's disapproval of Japan's policy in the Far East during the Great War, and of British distrust of Japan's pledges in the future. If Japan had played the part we expected of her during the war there could be no question of denouncing the Alliance. If, in 1920, we evince a desire to have our hands free, only one possible interpretation can be placed upon our action. Do we wish the Alliance abrogated or renewed? If we desire it renewed, upon what basis? These questions we must leave for consideration in a subsequent article.

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## V.

### THE MAKING OF A NEW TREATY.

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(April 17, 1920.)

We concluded our last article on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with two questions: Do we wish the Alliance abrogated or renewed? If we desire it renewed, upon what basis? We are going to-day to impose a slight strain upon our readers' imagination. We are going to ask them to imagine that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has never yet been in existence, but that an Alliance upon identical terms to that concluded on July 13, 1911, is being negotiated between London and Tokio, with a view to coming into force this or next year. We are going to ask them, further, to imagine that present-day Diplomacy no longer consists of the use of language to glose over facts, or to bring into being Treaties that are nothing more nor less than Scraps of Paper. We are going to be so daring as to assume that when an International Treaty says a thing, it means it, it binds the parties to it strictly to the obligations assumed, and that neither Party is free to place its own interpretation upon the meaning of such obligations, regardless of the interests and wishes of the other. To avoid being tedious we are going to assume that the League of Nations Covenant is also a binding Treaty upon both parties and upon all other nations with whom the possibility of a conflict is ever likely to arise, so that we need not concern ourselves with what Britain or Japan would be bound to do, or not do, in the event of another war. The only part of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, therefore, which we have to consider is the Preamble and Article I. To avoid any misunderstanding it is best, perhaps, to reproduce the objects of the Alliance as set forth in the Preamble, and the first Article of the Treaty:

The stipulations, which are stated to have the same object as those in the 1905 Treaty, are:

A. The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

B. The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

C. The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:—

Art. I. It is agreed that whenever in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

The basis of the (new) Alliance, then, is to be the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and extending from Siberia to India, and undoubtedly including the internal peace as well as the external peace of the regions affected. It would, therefore, embrace any Japanese activities in Siberia calculated to provoke, rather than to repress disorder. And in view of what has happened recently in Siberia, where there seems to be no shadow of doubt that Japanese militarists behaved aggressively and rashly, the British Government would, we think, be entitled to claim that the complete evacuation of Russian territory by the Japanese Army should be a condition precedent to the signature of the Treaty.

We pass on to the next clause, which in our opinion is the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. It is to be noted that, in contrast with the original Alliance Treaty of 1902, in which emphasis was laid on the special interests of Great Britain in China, and the special interests of Japan in Korea and in China, and which does not even mention the integrity of China, this new Treaty gives it a place only second to that of the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace. Further, it should be noted that this portion of the Treaty excludes any selfish motives. The aim of the parties is stated to be "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China," which is to be achieved by "insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." Now if the new Treaty is to mean anything at all, if it is not merely to be an expression of pious (or hypocritical) sentiment, we must obviously inquire whether China's independence and integrity exist, to be preserved. We know that China is not a fully Sovereign State, that extraterritoriality shields foreign residents in the country from the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese Law Courts, and that as a logical consequence foreigners do not possess unrestricted rights of residence and trade. We know also that for many years Settlements have existed, under foreign municipal administration, in which Foreigners can reside with reasonable safety to life and property, and in reasonably hygienic surroundings. These are facts which are within the knowledge not only of the parties negotiating the Treaty, but also, of every Power having most-favoured-nation rights in China. The test of what does and what does not constitute "the independence and integrity" of China, therefore, it seems to us, must be the application of the principle "of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." And here, at once, we come up against the crux of the whole matter. Do either or both parties to the Treaty really uphold that principle? Do either of them claim and exercise commercial rights of a monopolistic character? One thinks naturally, in this connection, of the railways under their administration. Are these railways public services, financed and administered for the wellbeing of the country, or are they tentacles for establishing powerful Japanese or British commercial and political interests in this country? We do not think that any Japanese has seriously suggested that the railways operated under British supervision are so used. They are Chinese Government railways, under the control, with certain limitations as to personnel and supervision, of the Ministry of Communications. And it has never yet been charged against them that the goods of any nation receive preferential rates or treatment. Can the same be said of the railways under Japanese control? It certainly cannot with reference to the South Manchuria Railway, and its branches, in which foreigners are not permitted to hold shares, and which have been made a pretext for the creation of zones garrisoned by Japanese troops. South Manchuria has become to all intents and purposes a Japanese Province. No Japanese would even suggest that Chihli or Kiangsu Provinces have been Anglicized by the existence of the Peking-Mukden and Shanghai-Nanking Railways. Again, take the case of the Shantung Railway, and compare it with the Southern section of the Pukow Railway. On the former, half the freight is carried free as Government cargo, and does not pay any transportation charge, including "coal sold by the railway to vessels for bunkers" and "all building materials for Government buildings in Tsingtao." What has happened at Tsingtao itself is common knowledge. "Mr. Burkill," wrote a Japanese contemporary recently, referring to the recent speech of the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai, "charges Japan that she is determined to control the whole of the land in the neighbourhood of the harbour, docks, wharves and railway terminus. *Why should she not?*" Because, we reply, to do so conflicts with the "principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." One could go on to cite endless examples of the violation of this principle by Japan, but we need not labour the point further. We are assuming that Britain and Japan are about to enter an Alliance binding each of them to "preserve the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." and we say that to enter into such a Treaty until these words have been converted into acts, is humbug, pure and simple.

The third joint obligation is "the maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India and the defence of their special interests in the said regions." Before any such obligation can be entered into we must have a precise, explicit definition of what is comprized in the "territorial rights" and "special interests" of the High Contracting Parties. Is Great Britain, for instance, to be bound to recognize Japan's right as a consequence of the Twenty-one Demands to finance (and of course control and garrison) all railways in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia? Is she to recognize Japan's exclusive right to have her nationals appointed as political, financial, military, and police Advisers in South Manchuria? Is she compelled to acquiesce in the right similarly extorted from China to insist that only Japanese capital shall be employed in the Hanyehping Company? Is Britain, finally, to acquiesce in Japan's enjoyment of any "special interests" extorted by bribery and threats from a corrupt unrepresentative clique of officials in Peking? If these be our obligations under the new Treaty we are surely better off without it at all.

We will conclude this article by a brief reference to Art. 1 of the Treaty itself. It confers upon either party the privilege of full and frank communication with the other, whenever "in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy." Presumably that right may equally be exercised when those rights and interests, in the opinion of Great Britain, are in jeopardy from Japan. But it would be well to have a clear understanding on this point, and—inasmuch as full and frank communication might not result in "common measures to safeguard those menaced rights and interests—" to provide some impartial Tribunal to adjudicate upon any difference of opinion between the Allies. Such a Tribunal might be found in the Council of the League of Nations, but whatever Tribunal be agreed upon, its decisions must be final, and binding on both parties. So many of "the common interests of all Powers in China," however, are in jeopardy to-day as the result of Japanese policy during the past five or six years that before the Treaty is entered into it would, one would think, be desirable to have a clear understanding as to Japan's intentions, in order that it will not be necessary, from the first day of the new Alliance, to take Japan to task for violations of the undertakings to consolidate and maintain the general peace of the Far East and to preserve the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. And it should, we think, be clearly understood that where the "special interests" of either Ally are in conflict with those undertakings, the latter, not the "special interests" must prevail.

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## VI.

### ABROGATION OR REVISION?

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(April 20, 1920.)

It is not unreasonable to urge that if the Alliance is to be renewed, Britain, as well as Japan, should derive some advantage from its renewal. Powers do not enter into Alliances unless they expect to derive some benefit from such a course, whether it take the form of freedom to develop a policy which both Allies have at heart, or the protection of each other's interests in the event of hostilities in which either Ally is involved. It is, therefore, only reasonable to inquire whether the British Empire can expect any advantages from the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which it could not reasonably expect to enjoy without an Alliance with Japan. The war has shown us how Japan interprets her obligations under the Alliance in its present form, when her Ally is "involved in war" as the result of "an unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of another Power. Japan interpreted her obligations in the narrowest possible sense. From the time of the reduction of Tsingtau her chief concern appears to have been to exploit to the full the preoccupation of her Ally in Europe, for her own selfish objects in China. As we have stated in a previous article, our chief gratitude to Japan must be based upon the fact that she abstained from attacking the territories of her Ally in the Far East, at a moment when we should have found it extremely embarrassing to defend them.

But what of the future? Can we reasonably expect a change in Japan's attitude? Is it conceivable that the extension of the Alliance will further our policies in Eastern Asia, and ensure the protection of our possessions in this portion of the Globe? We have seen that the policies of Great Britain and Japan, respectively, in China are absolutely irreconcilable. Not only do we not approve of much that Japan has done in China during the past five years, but our own interests have suffered very substantially through our passive acquiescence. We have incurred, both in China and America, some of the moral obloquy which our Ally has earned by her actions in the Far East. We have, at certain crises in the recent history of China, been unable, owing to our loyalty to the Alliance, to range ourselves openly on the side of America and other enlightened Powers in opposition to Japan. Our Statesmen have frequently found it impossible to give frank or full replies to reasonable inquiries regarding developments in the Far East, for fear of wounding Japanese susceptibilities. We have been compelled by the exigencies of the European situation, temporarily to concede to Japan the role of paramount Power in the Far East, and meekly to acquiesce in intrigues and outrages revolting to the Anglo-Saxon conscience. Are we to put the seal of approval upon our Ally's actions by the renewal of a Pact which she has thus abused?

The abrogation of the Alliance would be a great relief to the British Empire as a whole, which has much to lose, and nothing to gain, by its perpetuation. If the League of Nations Covenant, to which Japan like ourselves is a signatory, means what it says, every advantage we actually enjoy by virtue of the Alliance will still be ours. For under it, Japan is pledged to "respect and preserve as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." Under it Japan is pledged to submit "to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council" every dispute likely to lead to a rupture with another Member of the League. And under it, "should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants...it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League." If the Covenant, then, be something more than a mere "scrap of paper," we have nothing to fear from Japan if the Alliance be abrogated, while, instead of meekly acquiescing in her aggression in the East, under the specious pretext that we are bound to support our Ally, we should be able to challenge, and insist upon its submission to the Council of the League, every Japanese action which we considered of an aggressive or immoral character.

Our interests in either hemisphere do not march harmoniously with those of Japan, and our Alliance with her constitutes a serious obstacle to a real Anglo-American rapprochement. In this part of the world both Britain and America stand for the Open Door, abolition of special privileges, fairplay for China, the eradication of militarism, and "the destruction of every arbitrary Power anywhere that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world." Elsewhere the two great Anglo-Saxon nations are united in their determination to resist unrestricted Asiatic immigration, a policy based upon economic and racial considerations which cannot be overborne. Britain and America desire to see a strong, united China, with an efficient Government of its own choosing. Japan's policy is in opposition to ours at nearly every point. She does not want the Open Door, though she will sign agreements innumerable approving of it in principle, so long as she is the door-keeper. She is striving night and main to secure formal recognition of her "special privileges." Fairplay for China does not even appear in her political creed. And if any proof were needed of the existence in the Far East of an "arbitrary Power" capable of "secretly and of its single choice" disturbing the peace of the world, surely we have had it recently in the aggressive actions of the Japanese militarists in Manchuria and Siberia. We can only continue to walk in the same pathway as Japan if we are content to tramp stolidly behind her with a torpid conscience. Neither the British Government of to-day, nor any British Government we are likely to have within the present generation, would dare to become an accomplice, upon equal terms, in Japan's policy in China. Our aspirations and traditions, moreover, do not fit us for the role of a passive accomplice in the commission of deeds of which we disapprove.

If the prosecution of British policy in the Far East—the policy that in the end will be the best for China and for all the nations that have political or commercial relations with her—can only be effected by the abrogation of the Alliance, then, in our opinion, there ought to be no hesitation about denouncing it. Such a step would enable Britain and America, whose aims and interests in the Far East are almost identical, to work with a harmony and intimacy which has been impossible while Japan has invariably had to be consulted before we could take action, and has not infrequently committed us—to the extent at least of sharing the opprobrium attaching to her actions—without consulting us, or in any way considering our interests. The abrogation of the Alliance would at least have the effect of causing much heart-searching in Japanese political circles, and if her efforts to find another powerful Ally failed, she would probably, by force of circumstances, become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the League of Nations Covenant, which alone could guarantee her security in her isolation. If the Alliance is to be renewed, if, that is to say, the British Government is so tender regarding Japanese feelings that it shrinks from cutting the tie—which to many of us has seemed more like a halter during the past few years—the Alliance should be subjected to such drastic revision as will leave no doubt as to the intentions and *bona fides* of both parties. British interests in the Far East, which certainly ought to be taken into serious consideration in this connection, are weary of a Pact which, so far as they can judge means nothing so far as Japan is concerned but a grudging pledge not to engage in active hostilities against us when we are involved in a war elsewhere. We are prepared to place all our cards on the table, and state with precision, and without mental reservations or vague phraseology, the principles of our policy in the Far East. Is Japan prepared to do the same, and, having done so to live up to her principles? In the final article of this series we propose to deal, as briefly as possible, with the principles which, in our opinion, must be insisted upon, if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is to be renewed.

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## VII.

### CHINA AND THE ALLIANCE.

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(April 21, 1920.)

In our last article we expressed the deliberate opinion that Britain had nothing to gain from the renewal of the Alliance that would not be equally guaranteed to her by the enforcement of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this, the final article of the series, we shall assume that the British Government is prepared under certain conditions to renew the Alliance, and state very frankly what, in our opinion, those conditions ought to be. But before doing so it may be well to turn aside for a moment to answer one objec-

tion which is certain to be raised in some quarters to the publication of these articles. It will be suggested, or alleged that we waited until the European war was over to set forth with what will be regarded in some quarters, as brutal frankness, our opposition to the Alliance in its present form, and that we, in common with the rest of the British Press maintained a discreet silence regarding the misdeeds of our Ally during the war. That suggestion, or allegation, so far as we are concerned, is false. Throughout the negotiations preceding the Ultimatum of May 7, 1915, we were almost daily expressing the opinion that the Twenty-One Demands constituted a deliberate violation on the part of Japan of the terms of the Alliance. And on May 7, 1915, the very day on which the Ultimatum was presented, discussing the possibility of British acquiescence or connivance we used these words:

"We are asked to believe that a Government whose Premier publicly declared that 'we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good-faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong, over-mastering Power,' was willing, in Asia, to allow Japan to commit the very crime for which he so scathingly denounced Germany. Can any thinking man believe that statesmen of Mr. Asquith's or Sir Edward Grey's calibre would be guilty of such duplicity? The question has only to be put in this way to be answered with an emphatic negative. The British Government would incur lasting infamy if it became a party to the infringement of the rights of a weaker Neutral State. It has not done so; of that we are convinced. Nor will it ever do so while the British nation values its honour, and the respect of other nations."

Now for the conditions of renewal. When the third Alliance Treaty was signed in 1911, a few months before the Chinese Revolution, both Parties pledged themselves to consolidate and maintain the general peace in Eastern Asia, to preserve the common interests of all powers by insuring the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations, to maintain the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in Eastern Asia, and to defend their special interests in those regions. These obligations, so far as Japan is concerned, have not been honoured. The "independence and integrity" of China in 1911 was, to the knowledge of both Parties, modified by the existence of Treaties under which Japan was entitled to occupy the Liaotung Peninsula, Dairen and Port Arthur, *until the expiration of twenty-five years from March 27, 1898, or until March 27, 1923*; while Great Britain, on her part was entitled to hold and occupy Weihaiwei *until the return of Port Arthur to China*. By her Ultimatum of May 7, 1915, Japan compelled China, to use the words of the Chinese Memorandum, "to abandon its cherished hopes to regain control of these places and properties at the expiration of their respective original terms of lease" and to extend the term of Japan's occupation and control of South Manchuria to ninety-nine years. We assert, without hesitation, that this was a gross violation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which even to-day should not be condoned, and that before Great Britain even entertains the idea of renewing the Alliance, this lease should revert to its original basis. We admit that this is a drastic proposal, but we are acting upon the assumption that the Alliance, if renewed, is no longer to be a "scrap of paper," and only by foregoing the concessions wrested from China by coercion in 1915, can Japan rehabilitate herself internationally, and prove her good faith. "Japan," said Judge Gary at a recent reception to the Japanese Ambassador in New York, "had never broken a promise." Evidently Judge Gary had not pursued his investigations very far, or he would have found, in the Sino-Japanese Agreement of Sept. 4, 1909, a promise to deliver up to China the Tashichao-Yingkow branch, together with the South Manchuria Railway "upon the expiration of the term of concession for the main line." The reversion of the Lease of territory and the railway concessions to their original status would mean the restoration of China's sovereignty over the Liaotung Peninsula in 1923; and the reversion to Chinese control, under terms to be arranged, of the South Manchuria Railway, at the expiration of the thirty-six years for which the Concession was originally granted.

The independence of China to-day is violated by the presence upon her soil of foreign garrisons other than the troops provided for under the 1901 Protocol, and the limited number of railway guards permitted for the guarding of the South Manchuria and Chinese Eastern Railways. Great Britain should insist, therefore, as condition precedent to the renewal of the Alliance upon the withdrawal of all Japanese troops on Chinese soil whose presence is not provided for in Treaties or Agreements in operation on July 13, 1911.

Although Tsingtau was forcibly occupied by Germany in 1898, her administration of the Port and Leased Territory aroused no serious opposition until 1914, when Tsingtau became a base for warlike operations against Allied shipping. The German methods of administration were liberal compared with those of the Japanese, who are aiming to make it a closed port. The restoration to China of Tsingtau, under conditions which guarantee equality of treatment to all the Powers should therefore be insisted upon by Great Britain.

The Shantung Railway which is at present being used mainly to exploit Japanese interests, and as a pretext for the presence of Japanese garrisons in Shantung, should become a Chinese Government State Railway, operated by a Sino-Japanese Administration, on terms similar to the State railways operated under British supervision.

The practice of treating the nationality of members of the Customs Service employed in the higher branches of the Service at Tsingtau and Dairen as a test of fitness, which in effect places the heads of the Customs in these ports under the jurisdiction of an interested Power, should be discontinued.

Britain and Japan should mutually agree to withdraw their Post Offices from China as soon as France, Italy, and the United States are prepared to do likewise.

It is not suggested that the above conditions should be incorporated in the Treaty of Alliance, but that they should be agreed to, and, so far as is necessary fulfilled, prior to the renewal of the Alliance

As to the text of the Treaty itself, we suggest that, assuming the above conditions to be fulfilled, it be modified only in so far as it may be necessary *to make China a party*. It is a serious departure from the usual practice in international relations for two Powers to enter into an agreement respecting the interests of a third Power without the latter's assent, and one which in our view, ought not, in this instance, to be perpetuated. It was, we know, by this procedure that the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1839. But it is recognized in the Treaty of Versailles that "the Treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war, *no longer conform to the requirements of the situation*," and accordingly the Neutrality Treaty has been abrogated. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance conforms even less to the requirements of the situation from the Chinese point of view. It does not guarantee China's neutrality. It has failed to protect her from the aggression of one of the Parties. And it therefore seems to us to be beyond dispute that China, as the party most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East, in the preservation of her independence and integrity, and in the upholding of the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations within her borders, should become a party to the Alliance. There may be objections to such a course from the Japanese point of view, but if Great Britain really has the objects set forth in the Preamble at heart, she should welcome the accession of China to the Alliance. It is, after all, China who is, or should be the best judge of what does and does not threaten or violate her independence and integrity, and it is inconsistent with the pledge given by the British and all other Allied Ministers in August 1917, on behalf of their Governments, to "do all that rests with them to ensure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and the regard due to a great country," for two Powers whose interests may not always coincide with those of China, and who are really not disinterested parties to enter into agreements dealing with matters of vital interest to China, without her participation and consent. The inclusion of China in what would then become a Triple Alliance for the preservation of peace in the Far East, and the maintenance of her integrity and independence and of the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations, would constitute the most effective guarantee that nothing affecting her welfare would be done by either of the other Parties without full and frank consultation with her. And the only practical argument against such a course seems to us to be the helplessness and inefficiency of the Chinese Government of to-day. It is an open question, however, how far that helplessness and inefficiency are to be attributed to the intrigues of Japan. And the inclusion of China within the scope of the Alliance would, at least for the period of its duration, constitute a firm guarantee that there would be no further Sino-Japanese "conversations" of the character which preceded the Ultimatum of 1915.

A few more words and we have done. The series of articles of which this is the last deals with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from the point of view of a Briton in the Far East. Most of the facts mentioned are within the knowledge of all Britons who have resided in China during the past eight or nine years. The deductions from those facts are necessarily a matter of individual opinion. We have attempted to be frank to the point of brutality because we believe the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to demand frankness. Ill-informed writers and public-men in Europe and America present the public with a picture of Japan and her activities in the Far East which all impartial observers who have been in the Far East know to be a travesty of the truth. If we have erred to the extent of exaggerating the other side of the picture we have done so without malice, and solely with the desire to reveal what most intelligent Britons in this part of the world have been thinking, if they have not been saying, during the crisis from which the British Empire has recently emerged. We must not be interpreted as suggesting that in all that has happened in China since the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty Japan has been wholly in the wrong, and we wholly in the right. There have been mistakes, serious mistakes, on the part of British statesmanship as well as on the part of the statesmen of Japan. There have been times when our own policy towards China has not been free from the taint of Imperialism and aggression. The war, however, has led to a revision of our standards and our policy. We are endeavouring, we have been endeavouring for the past five years, to apply those new standards to our relations with other Powers. In the exigencies of war that has not always proved an easy or indeed a possible task. But our eyes are fixed upon the hills for which we are making. The Conference of British Chambers of Commerce at Shanghai, last year, was a sign of the times. The resolutions it adopted, the discussions that preceded them, indicated an attitude towards China and her problems which would have been considered visionary and idealistic only a few years ago. Britons throughout the East to-day are champions of fairplay for the country in which they live and trade. And their opposition to Japanese policies in this country is based upon the conviction that they are unfair to China, unfair to other nations, inconsistent with Anglo-Saxon ideals, and harmful to our good name as Japan's Ally. It may be that Japan herself will emerge from the present political turmoil with new standards, and honest and just policies. The almost universal opposition of the Japanese Press to the recent excesses of the Japanese Militarists in Siberia is a hopeful sign. But until we know Japan's intentions, until we know the path that she intends to tread, we ought not longer to be associated with her, even nominally, in her Far Eastern enterprises. We could and did plead that during the war we were too preoccupied in Europe to check Japanese aggression in China. That plea will no longer serve. As long as we are Allies we must in the eyes of the world, share the moral responsibility of Japan's actions. Can we continue to do so without druging our consciences, and conniving at violations of principles, the "maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world?"









